

CONTEXT

The context analysis should include the specific aspects and factors that are important to introduce the protection risk analysis. The PAF specific questions for context should help in presenting only context-related factors that help and support the understanding of the protection risks analysis.

REPUBLIC OF SORAMI | December 2022

PROTECTION RISKS Text: max. 6 pages

RISK 1 Attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings

According to the Sorami National Police (SNP), between June and December 2022, at least 2,344 people were killed, injured or kidnapped as a result of armed violence, which has included armed attacks, air and drone strikes, shelling, missile attacks and conflict-related sexual violence. The aggressions represent an increase of 18% compared to the 1,923 cases registered between January and June 2022. Men comprise the majority of victims (86% or 2,016 individuals), followed by women (10% or 234 individuals) and children as young as 5 years old (4% or 94 individuals). No socio-economic category of the population has been spared. The number of people killed and injured in 2022 exceeded by far those documented in 2020 (1,640) and 2021 (1,989)³⁸. The departments most affected are Ateppo (7% or 168), N'gurtu (9% or 211), Tissura (11% or 254) and Piru (14% or 321). In these departments an average of between 7 to 13 individuals have been either killed, injured or kidnapped in the last 6 months. A total of 11 villages have been almost completely destroyed.

The areas more at risk include rural villages in the areas of Ateppo, Tissura, Upper Syle and Lombardy and IDP sites in the areas of N'gurtu, Piru, South Salla and Solbei, particularly the closest to areas controlled by the Popular Front of Southern Sorami (PFSS) and the operational commands of governmental authorities. Armed violence skyrocketed following the government's decision to approve Law 6/42 in January 2022³⁹, which provides central control over departmental budget and funding, in an attempt to hamper the ethnic federalism created in 1992 to put an end to the Sorami Civil War.

This decision has further exacerbated existing tensions between nomads, farmers and IDPs, among which an average 1,478 victims have been registered between 2010 and 2020. In the last three months, the farming season fell in tandem with nomads migrating their livestock, specifically in Ateppo, Tissura, Upper Syle, Piru and Solbei. Nomads often accuse farmers within IDPs groups of infringing migration routes or returning to areas where, according to them, IDPs do not originate from. IDPs accuse nomads of destroying their crops. Data from the Rural and Pastoralist network, together with the PoC monitoring show that around 1,236 hectares of cultivable land has been destroyed in the last 6 months, around 1,384 cattle killed and 11 villages destroyed⁴⁰.

The effects of armed attacks include direct and indirect targeting of civilian infrastructure, include specifically health and education facilities. The monitoring mechanism of the Ministry of Health and WHO has registered 65 attacks on health facilities, compared to 34 in the previous quarter. From the 1st of July, the General Directorate of National Education, together with the Education Cluster, have reported 310 burnt out classrooms, and a total of 478 incidents including harassment to children and teachers and injuries. As a result, most of the facilities have stopped functioning, preventing civilians from accessing basic services: the department of Ateppo, Tissura, Piru and South Salla do not have any working facilities, while in the rest of regions around 20% of the facilities is still running. As a result, the civilian population, which also comprises 345,581 IDPs, has been forced to move to escape attacks and due to the general insecurity. An increased demographic pressure has been registered specifically in the regions of North Salla, East Salla and Canna, due to the absence of conflict in those areas, with an average influx of 32,550⁴¹ people per month during the last 3 months. This trend is particularly worrying, since it is increasing the number of unaccompanied children (no official number has yet been recorded) and it is increasing tensions in

Page 6

SOCIAL AND PSYCHO-SOCIAL EFFECTS
General illustration of the main effects on the social, cultural and ethnic relations and fabric. Indicate what specific secondary effects increase the impact of the identified threats.

THREATS
Data or indicators illustrating the level, frequency, type of action and trend compared to previous period.

DEMOGRAPHY, LOCATION, PHYSICAL EFFECTS
Brief indication of vulnerability to the identified threats, by location and demographic group.

EXPOSURE
Indication of the locations and/or groups more exposed. Brief information on whether this exposure is predictable (related to an identified situation), occasional or continuous.

ORIGIN
Pinpoint a factor / reason showcasing whether the threats identified are due to purposeful, planned or other types of action by those who are committing them.

DRIVERS & NORMS
Data or indicators illustrating the level, frequency, type of action and trend compared to previous period.

PHYSICAL & MATERIAL EFFECTS
Primary effects of the actions identified (e.g. destruction), backed up by data. Indication of secondary effects (e.g. stop of services) and their impact on population, which can be based on data or observation.

COPING STRATEGIES, MOVEMENTS
Indication on how the population is reacting, and what effects the applied coping strategies create, both positively and negatively. If possible, provide location specifics.

REPUBLIC OF SORAMI | December 2022

the reception areas. Particularly worrying is the possibility of extending the ethnic tensions between the Runis and the Alemi to the reception areas, where the ethnic group of the Bartai normally resides.

To mitigate violence, the Governors of Ateppo, Tissura, Piru and South Salla have unsuccessfully deployed peaceful co-existence committees, consisting of community leaders and government authorities to quell tensions and mediate disputes in hotspot locations. In the departments of Solbei, Upper Syle and N'gurtu, the recent deployment of Joint Forces consisting of RAF and RTF, in coordination with the Regional Security Committee, on the contrary, have contributed to a recent de-escalation and better dialogue between the armed groups and the humanitarian actors providing assistance.

This deployment has been coordinated with the Group of Ethnic Leaders that, at national level, has historically governed the relationships between the different groups. This has been perceived as a reaction to the rising of a local inter-ethnic self-defense group that started to challenge the ethnic leadership at local level on preserving the social cohesion and stability of the mix-villages they live in. This new trend, together with the decision of the Security Council to extend the UNAMS mandate and increase the deployment of Protection of Civilians monitors, may have positive effect on the level of violence. However, this improvement is not expected for the next semester since the departmental leaders of the armed groups have a high level of autonomy. Yet, an improvement for the second part of 2023 may be possible.

RISK 2 Siege and unlawful impediments to movements

RISK 3 Conflict-related gender and Intimate Partner Violence

RISK 4 Forced evictions of IDP gatherings

RISK 5 Serious maiming and injuries due to explosive Hazards

Page 7

COPING STRATEGIES, MOVEMENTS
General illustration of the main effects on the social, cultural and ethnic relations and fabric. Indicate what specific secondary effects increase the impact of the identified threats.

LOCAL MECHANISMS
Primarily identify what local capacities are put in place, and how these local capacities contribute positively or negatively to mitigate threat's effects.

LOCAL AND OTHER MECHANISMS
Illustrate a combination of capacities, that may be having an effect on mitigate the threat's effects.

CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CAPACITIES
Provide a brief overview on existing cultural and social capacities acting as driver of mechanisms, or that have a direct impact on mitigating threat's.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Highlight important factors or types of international response contributing to mitigating the threat's effects.

DETERRENTS
Provide a closing paragraph on one-two important deterrents identified, possibly concluding on the effects of those for the forthcoming period.

TIPS

- Information managers can use the PAF to **assess the information landscape & structure data against PAF sub-pillars and categories**.
- There is no need of using PAF sub-pillars and categories linearly. However, it is useful to present the analysis in the PAU using the PAF pillars' order: **threat, threat's effects** and **capacities**.
- The protection risk analysis is stronger when **drivers, causes and effects include other sectors**. It is better to include protection-only analysis in other documents: Protection briefs, Protection Updates, HNOs, etc.

TOOLS

- Protection Analytical Framework
- Definitions of 15 standard protection risks
- Protection risks explanatory note

