

STAIT MISSION REPORT

SOMALIA

MISSION DATES: 13–23 SEPTEMBER

RELEASE DATE: 04-11-2016

CONTEXT

1. Somalia is on a positive political trajectory, but significant humanitarian needs persist as a consequence of seasonal shocks, insecurity, and inadequate access to and provision of basic services. An estimated 5 million people out of a total population of approximately 11 million are food insecure and need life-saving and livelihoods support; about 320,000 children under the age of five are acutely malnourished (50,000 are severely malnourished and at risk of dying if they do not receive assistance); and more than 1.1 million people live in protracted displacement throughout the country in a crisis that has lasted for some 30 years and scarred the lives of two generations.
2. The El Niño climatic phenomenon has exacerbated drought conditions in the region, particularly in Somaliland and Puntland. The severe drought conditions earlier this year affected an estimated 1.7 million people. The *Gu* rains (April-June) offered some relief but also brought challenges: livestock were lost, people were displaced, and disease outbreaks necessitated humanitarian health interventions. Variable (although not uncommon) climatic conditions exacerbate the suffering of communities who have inadequate coping strategies and receive insufficient development assistance to resist the impact of drought and floods.
3. Conflict and insecurity remain one of the drivers of needs in Somalia. Al Shabaab militias have attacked communities and caused displacement and human suffering since 2006. The African Union Peacekeeping Mission (AMISOM) has provided some stability, but the realignment and reconfiguration of the force has seen areas fall back under the control of respective Al Shabaab militias following troop withdrawals. This was most recently noted in the areas of Gedo, Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba in the first quarter of 2016.
4. In addition to climatic and security challenges, Somalia suffers from extreme poverty and massively inadequate access to, and provision of basic services. The country is consistently ranked at the bottom of development and humanitarian ranking lists. The INFORM global risk management tool measures the overall risk in Somalia at 8.7 based on exposure to hazards, vulnerability and coping capacities. The next highest risk countries globally are the Central African Republic and South Sudan measuring 8.3 and 7.9 respectively¹. There is insufficient data to provide a ranking based on comprehensive data in the Human Development Report but the limited data (from 2006) would have ranked Somalia as the second least developed country in the world (fractionally ahead of Niger)². Child malnutrition and mortality rates are among the highest in the world, and more than 73% of the population live below the poverty line. While this is not directly a humanitarian challenge, it certainly contributes to suffering and limits the coping mechanisms of communities to deal with a crisis.

¹ <http://www.inform-index.org/Results/Global>

² http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr15_standalone_overview_en.pdf

5. There are close to one million Somali refugees living in the region and approximately 440,000 reside in Kenya. In May of this year, the Government of Kenya announced plans to shut down the Dadaab refugee camp close to Kenya's eastern border with Somalia. A number of Somali refugees are voluntarily returning in an operation facilitated by UNHCR to their places of origin. This large scale return needs to be supported by a sustainable reintegration programme in areas of return that suffer from some of the lowest human development indicators in the world, climatic variability that cause drought and flooding, high levels of insecurity, very low levels of basic service provision, high unemployment and few viable livelihoods options. The challenges are significant and will require the support of the broad humanitarian and development community.
6. The international presence in Somalia is substantial. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), is a political mission led by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG); and development and humanitarian operations are led by a Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator who is also the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (D-SRSG) in the political mission. The international presence is organised as part of an integrated mission that is intended to bring the combined efforts of the political, peacekeeping, development, human rights, and humanitarian operations together to reinforce each other to deliver on an ambitious agenda of political reform, state building, democratisation, security sector reform, and humanitarian assistance.
7. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is the internationally recognised government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The state formation process is ongoing, with the support of the United Nations and development assistance is desperately needed in the country to complement humanitarian action.

METHODOLOGY

8. The STAIT mission was organised on the invitation of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) for Somalia and took place between the 13th and 23rd September, 2016.
9. The STAIT team adopted a bottom-up approach to its work and consulted over 250 people, including Somali people affected by the crisis, in four coordination hubs: Mogadishu (Somalia), Nairobi (Kenya), Garowe (Puntland) and Hargeisa (Somaliland). The mission members divided their presence between Nairobi and Mogadishu to cover both of the response's operational centres simultaneously. The Mogadishu team travelled to Garowe to look at the humanitarian operation in the field at the sub-national level, and the Nairobi team visited Hargeisa for the same purpose. The mission engaged with Government officials, affected people, UN agencies, clusters, and international and national NGOs in all locations.
10. The team carried out six participatory self-assessment exercises with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), the inter cluster coordination group (ICCG), international NGOs, national NGOs and the humanitarian coordination teams in Puntland and Somaliland. The team also held bilateral interviews with heads of operational organisations; development actors; the UN political mission, UNSOM; the African Union's peacekeeping force, AMISOM; donors; and agency regional offices. The team organised focus group discussions with cluster coordinators and selected cluster members. The team also met with people affected by the crises in two field locations to listen to their concerns and opinions on the humanitarian response.
11. The mission team organised a HCT retreat on the final day of the mission to review initial findings and build consensus with HCT members on potential areas for improvement. The retreat provided the basis of the Action Plan (annex 1) that the HCT has committed to implement.
12. The team consisted of six core members that participated in the mission in an impartial manner, representing the inter-agency commitment, and not their own agency: Panos Mourtzis (STAIT, Director and Team Leader), Ulrika Blom (NRC), Gian Carlo Cirri (STAIT, Director), Michael Copland (Coordinator, Global Child Protection AOR), Cyril Ferrand (Coordinator, Global Food Security Cluster), and Hajir Maalim (ACF). Stuart Kefford (STAIT) planned, supported and participated in the mission.

NEXT STEPS

13. The RC/HC/DSRSG, in consultation with the HCT, will **provide an update** on the implementation of the HCT action plan (Annex 1) **by 1st May, 2017**. The update will be sent to the **Emergency Relief Coordinator** and will be shared with the IASC Emergency Directors' Group (EDG).
14. The STAIT will provide support, where possible, to the RC/HC/DSRSG to implement the Action Plan. At the global level, the STAIT will seek to engage with agency headquarters and work with the Emergency Directors' Group (EDG), global clusters, and other inter-agency subsidiary bodies to facilitate support as required.

SUMMARY OF MAIN ISSUES AND ACTIONS

LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION	
<p>Spirit of togetherness: HCT needs to function as a team</p>	<p>The HCT needs to function as a cohesive team, led by the HC and guided by a jointly defined vision to deliver assistance effectively to people in need, based on the principles that define humanitarian work. HCT members are an integral part of the leadership team and need to demonstrate a stronger spirit of togetherness in their approach to the humanitarian operation. It is important for the team to have regular face-to-face HCT meetings in Mogadishu with all members in the same physical location, engage in joint initiatives, and carry out joint missions to engage with regional / state authorities. This will strengthen the togetherness and cohesiveness of the team and more clearly indicate where the operation's centre of gravity is.</p>
<p>HCT – HCT members: mutual accountability</p>	<p>HCT members should reinforce the commitment of mutual accountability to a number of key collective results by agreeing to a HC/HCT Compact for mutual accountability. This means HCT members taking on leadership responsibilities and actively and demonstrably supporting the development and implementation of a strategic vision for the humanitarian operation that includes a selected number of key collective priorities: the role of the senior leadership on protection (Centrality of Protection), a collective approach on accountability to affected people, and a common understanding of, and direction on programmatic issues such as access in contested areas, cash as a delivery modality, and a comprehensive plan for the sustainable return and reintegration of returning refugees including with UNCT members. The vision should be developed by the HCT under the leadership of the HC.</p> <p>The Compact is a mechanism for two-way mutual accountability between the HC and HCT members to periodically review the performance of the team's collective effort to deliver humanitarian assistance. This should be done formally but in a light manner and supported by an annual self-assessment of the team.</p>
<p>Clear HCT vision and position needed on key issues:</p> <p>(a) access,</p> <p>(b) cash programming,</p> <p>(c) returns and reintegration from Dadaab</p>	<p>The HCT needs to agree a common position and provide a clear strategic direction on a number of issues. Issues requiring a clear vision and direction include: access; use of cash as a delivery modality; and the return and reintegration of refugees from Dadaab.</p> <p>The HC and HCT need to collectively agree on a vision and direction on issues where there is insufficient clarity of purpose and process and issue a simple one or two page position paper providing direction. The HCT vision and supporting briefing papers should be disseminated to all humanitarian actors.</p>
<p>HCT delegation of authority to the sub-national level</p>	<p>Delegate authority to senior level humanitarian teams in regions with a significant number of senior humanitarian teams to institute a more appropriate approach to planning, and to support more rapid joint decision making at the local level. Currently the humanitarian teams in the regions feel that a number of decisions should be made at the sub-national level. Area level strategic collective planning needs to take place, as opposed to each agency sending inputs to draft plans developed in Nairobi/Mogadishu without team discussions at the local level.</p> <p>The HCT should review the leadership and coordination structures at the sub-national level with a mind to strengthen the structures and delegate more authority, possibly to a Area Management Group (AMG) with senior UN/NGO representation.</p>

PROTECTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE (AAP)	
Senior leadership on protection	<p>The HCT needs to develop a strategy on the Centrality of Protection (CoP) focusing on two or three critical protection issues requiring collective advocacy and a common position by UN and NGO leadership. It should not be a stand-alone document but should form part of a comprehensive protection strategy that is based on the protection cluster's (including its sub-clusters) analysis of vulnerabilities. In addition, protection activities need to be mainstreamed in a practical, operational way across all clusters in the response as a whole, and protection critical issues could be a standard agenda item at HCT meetings.</p>
Collective mechanism to ensure accountability to affected people (AAP)	<p>The HCT does not have a collective approach to community feedback which informs their decision making and strategic processes. There are several good examples of agency and NGO project-based feedback but this information is currently not collated and used for the collective effort.</p> <p>The HCT can establish a collective system on AAP to bring together the individual efforts of agencies and NGOs to amplify the voices of people affected by the humanitarian situation in a manner that informs HCT strategic decision-making and helps adjust operational plans by the ICCG and clusters appropriately. The HCT can ensure the effective operationalisation of the response based on community feedback, and use the feedback to adapt operations accordingly and support a common HCT position on issues which require advocacy.</p>
PROGRAMMES AND DELIVERY	
Monitor and track the collective impact of the response; plan and deliver according to people's needs	<p>Establish a system to monitor at the strategic level the collective impact of the response on people's lives. The response is currently too sectorised. People in Somalia have multiple needs which need a strong coordinated response that provides assistance together: food security, nutrition, health, WASH, protection, security, livelihoods and other development interventions. Humanitarian actors have provided sectorised support for more than a decade and assessment data in some areas is almost unchanged. The HCT needs to look at the reasons investments have yielded little progress on people's lives and prospects and look at the possibility that broader coordinated assistance could have a more sustainable impact.</p>
Strengthen development programming in Somalia; mobilise development funding.	<p>Mobilise development resources to bring development actors into Somalia to complement the humanitarian operation. The linkages to early recovery and development thinking and programmes are at the heart of orienting the humanitarian response to have more sustainable results. Resilience and social protection programming is important in addressing humanitarian concerns and complement and support development objectives.</p> <p>Humanitarian response and development are mutually reinforcing if planned appropriately. The National Development Plan (pending) can provide the platform to mobilise much needed development funding, and the UN Country Team needs to capitalise on this opportunity to advocate for a development agenda which complements the HCT's humanitarian work.</p>
Strengthen the role of national partners	<p>Enhance the role of national and local NGOs as strategic and equal partners. The role of national NGOs in the response should not be limited to project-based implementation. National capacity needs to be more coherently integrated to influence the strategic direction of the response, and national actors should be respected as equal partners in the operation.</p> <p>International organisations need to commit to a substantial and sustainable capacity strengthening effort to national NGOs. This needs to be comprehensive and go beyond the provision of technical training opportunities. It needs to include a long-term approach that supports the day-to-day management of an NGO, financial reporting responsibilities, and other issues related to running a humanitarian organization. International organisations need to look at mentoring and partnership possibilities with national NGOs based around capacity strengthening.</p>

NARRATIVE MISSION REPORT

LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

15. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is inclusive in its composition: UN Agencies, international NGOs, two national NGOs and donors (on a rotational basis) are active participants in the HCT. It meets regularly, minutes are shared and action points are followed up. The HCT meets quarterly with the Inter Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) and the ICCG regularly raises operational issues to the HCT for consideration and to inform strategic guidance.
16. Despite its best efforts, there is a feeling that the HCT does not provide sufficient and clear strategic direction for the ICCG to effectively guide the clusters and cluster members to operationalise the response collectively i.e. all partners pulling in the same direction with a common goal and way of working.
17. The humanitarian operation in Somalia is vast and complex. There are huge food security and nutrition concerns, more than a million people living in protracted displacement throughout the country. The El Niño phenomenon brought severe drought conditions earlier this year that affected an estimated 1.7 million people. Insecurity and conflict is a major driver of humanitarian needs and a significant impediment to access for humanitarian organisations. In addition to these issues, the prospect of a return of Somali refugees from the Dadaab camp in Kenya brings an additional challenge to the humanitarian operation, which is underfunded and insufficiently supported by development activities (in parallel to humanitarian action) to provide durable solutions, and support basic service provision, stability, and security for communities.
18. These humanitarian challenges require the HCT to provide a focused strategic direction for the ICCG and operational partners to have a clear understanding of the humanitarian priorities, and the most effective ways in which to approach the challenges. The HCT has been effective in identifying the priorities. It produced a revised prioritisation plan earlier this year. But while the new priorities have been identified, partners are struggling to develop a common approach on the most effective ways to address the issues.
19. The planned repatriation process for the Somali refugees from Dadaab identifies lead roles and responsibilities for different agencies. The division of responsibilities is useful for planning the programme in a manageable way, but this should not be at the expense of a coordinated approach that supports the return *and* reintegration of Somali refugees together. There is a need to bring the discussion at the cluster and inter-cluster level to ensure plans are well communicated across a wide range of NGOs and UN agencies that are required to provide a wide range of services and support in a coordinated way *when* they return.
20. There is little agreement within the HCT on the challenges of access and delivering assistance based on a principled approach to humanitarian action. The Inter-Agency Access Task Force and OCHA's Humanitarian Affairs Officers (Access) should be complemented on the work they have done on bureaucratic impediments relating to access. The team has an excellent understanding of these challenges, a solid record of incidents, and has actively come together to advocate for humanitarian operations to be less encumbered by bureaucratic impediments on delivering assistance. However, there is a diverse range of opinions, and little agreement on the challenges of accessing contested areas, the extent to which access is impeding operations, and what the humanitarian community should do about it. The current proposal to have the newly appointed Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) focus on access issues is welcome.
21. Some individuals in the HCT feel that access to areas under the control of Al Shabaab is not a significant problem. There is a belief amongst some actors that humanitarian organisations are operating in these areas (although not to the desired extent) and delivering assistance discreetly. Other agency and NGO representatives feel that their ability to work in these areas is completely undermined and "*close to zero*" for a variety of reasons: safety and insecurity, absence of partners, and anti-terrorism legislation which forbids humanitarians to engage with groups designated as a terrorist organisation, even when the support is unintentional, such as treating an individual linked to al Shabaab in a treatment centre. These vividly contrasting views on access underpin the belief that the humanitarian community does not seem to know the extent to which aid is being delivered to al Shabaab controlled areas, who is delivering the assistance, and whether access is a problem or not.
22. The HCT needs to develop a more coherent view on access and have a clear understanding on the extent that it impedes the humanitarian operation. The Access Task Force would be the relevant body for this, and needs to strike the right balance in its focus between bureaucratic impediments to delivering assistance from national and Federal Authorities, and access challenges in contested areas. The ICCG will be crucial to relay information to the Task Force from operational partners on the challenges that they face.
23. There is also limited clarity on the most effective and efficient way to organise cash programming as a delivery modality for assistance. Cash programming has been a mainstay in Somalia for many years and

many humanitarian partners are delivering assistance with cash in a variety of ways: mobile money, money transfers, the hawala system, vouchers, conditional cash, unconditional cash, restricted cash and unrestricted cash.

24. Cash assistance is increasingly being used in humanitarian operations globally. In Somalia it accounts for 40% of the World Food Programme's (WFP's) operation, which illustrates the scale of cash as a delivery modality. However the system does not fully allow for the multi-purpose unrestricted use of cash by beneficiaries across different sectors (e.g. food, health, shelter etc). The sheer volume of cash as part of the response illustrates the importance of having a clear strategy to ensure it is delivered effectively, relates to people's needs, and is well coordinated across humanitarian partners. The HCT needs to provide clear strategic guidance on the purpose of cash assistance, stress the importance of establishing systems that deliver 'flexible' cash in a way that suits the needs of the people, and make sure that cash programmes are harmonised across agencies to avoid duplication of efforts.
25. There is currently little coordination on cash assistance in Somalia. There have been coordination platforms in Somalia in the past with ADESO and the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) playing a key role. A Cash Working Group still exists in Somalia, but there was a common belief amongst numerous actors that it needs to be strengthened.
26. There are, however, some positive developments in coordinating cash programming. WFP and UNICEF are currently working together through the WFP-developed SCOPE platform which is a database of beneficiaries that allows multi-purpose cash to be loaded onto one card from different organisations implementing cash programmes, which can be used against different commodities at different vendors. WFP and UNHCR are also working towards a partnership to use SCOPE. Furthermore, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) is encouraging NGOs involved in cash programming to implement through the SCOPE platform, and this is helping to bring a more consolidated approach and efficient way of working, in regard to cash. More work needs to be done, however. SCOPE's multi-purpose cash card is still restricted in its use. A family may have 100 USD on a card with, for example, with four cash contributions provided through the SCOPE system by WFP for food, UNICEF for nutrition, NRC for shelter needs, and WHO for health needs. The current system does not allow beneficiaries to freely spend the cash allocations they receive from various organizations on items or services of their choice. The multi-purpose cash card is a step in the right direction, but the humanitarian community needs to take a further step and programme according to people's needs rather than looking at it from the perspective of their agency mandate. The donors, too, have a significant role to play in this to make their contributions to cash programmes more flexible; and the senior leadership in the Somalia operation needs to lend their voice to the discussion (addressing donors) and provide clear strategic direction on cash as a delivery modality (to operational organisations).
27. The HCT has a responsibility to provide leadership on protection and accountability to people affected by the crisis (accountability to affected people, AAP). Specific to protection, the HCT in all humanitarian operations has a responsibility to develop a Centrality of Protection (CoP) Strategy as part of a comprehensive protection strategy, as articulated by the IASC Principals in their Statement on the Centrality of Protection in 2013. The Strategy should identify the two or three most significant protection challenges in the country that require senior engagement and it should be informed by a strong analysis from the Protection Cluster.
28. The HCT does not have this strategy in place at the moment despite showing a clear commitment to protection. The subject is frequently discussed, the HCT has defined protection priorities, and the HC has been a strong proponent on the importance of protection in the response. But there is a consensus that this has not been transferred into progressive action. As a first step and as a priority, the HC and HCT should work with the Protection Cluster to develop and approve the CoP strategy. The Cluster has a responsibility to provide a sound analysis of the protection situation to help develop the strategy. Other protection issues are covered in the following chapter of this report on Protection and AAP.
29. Similarly, a key responsibility of the HCT is to provide a strategic direction to partners based on feedback from people that are affected by the crisis. Individual organisations regularly engage in a two-way conversation with project beneficiaries on their needs, listen to their concerns, and adjust their programmes as a matter of course. However, feedback from affected communities is not consolidated to provide a big picture scenario for the HC and HCT, from which they can adjust strategic priorities and provide an appropriate and informed strategic direction to the ICCG. The HCT needs to establish a mechanism to bring the individual feedback from organisations into a collective approach. The ICCG will need to support the HCT in developing such a tool to have operational relevance.
30. While the HCT is inclusive in its membership and meets regularly (see para 15), the team has struggled to develop a real spirit of togetherness to work collectively as a team. The HCT members largely plan and implement their programmes individually, according to their own mandate, and based on their individual interpretation of events. The HCT has not developed a common vision or sense of togetherness that transcends these individual organizational approaches.

31. As already mentioned in past reports and previous reviews of the Somalia operation, the centre of gravity of the response remains unclear, regardless of the administrative arrangements each organization has opted for in regard to the geographical presence of the Representative. HCT meetings are systematically organized through (often poor quality) videoconferencing with split participation in Nairobi and Mogadishu, and this does little to generate a team spirit. The HCT members recognised this and committed, during the STAIT mission, to meet face-to-face on a monthly basis at HCT meetings, and to hold all HCT meetings in Mogadishu. Modalities for this need to be worked out, including potential support to local NGOs for travel costs, but the commitment is firm and bringing the HCT together under one roof on a regular basis will go a long way to building a spirit of togetherness to plan for, and address the array of complex challenges that can only be comprehensively overcome by working together.
32. In addition to physically coming together on a more regular basis, the HCT needs to be more inclusive in the way it works. While international and national NGOs are part of the team, there is a belief that their involvement is not considered on an equal level as other members. The HC and HCT members need to ensure that all members of the HCT have an equal voice and all members contributions to the agenda and strategic discussions are taken into account.
33. The HCT also needs to come together to clearly tell the Somalia **humanitarian story in a stronger and more compelling manner**. The Emergency Directors' mission report (June 2014) pointed out the '*disjointed and at times contradictory narrative on Somalia*' on the political, humanitarian and development situation. While Somalia is on a positive trajectory on the political reform front, the development and humanitarian spheres are confronted with major challenges. As a result it is difficult to articulate a unified and unambiguous messaging on the country situation. There is still a need to reconcile the various narratives and in particular to articulate a clearer storyline from the humanitarian perspective. This is a vital piece of work that needs to utilise the collective resources of agencies and NGOs communications teams, and will provide opportunities to strengthen resource mobilisation efforts.
34. The HCT and ICCG need to pay more attention to the humanitarian presence in the Federal Member States. There is a clear absence of a functioning humanitarian leadership and coordination fora in the two locations visited, Puntland and Somaliland. This needs to be addressed. The humanitarian teams in Puntland and Somaliland both critiqued the national level for paying insufficient attention to their presence and their contributions to national processes (planning the HRP, for instance). The humanitarian partners in both sub-national locations, almost as a unit, referenced the heavy top-down approach for programmes, planning and coordination, that emanates from Mogadishu and Nairobi, and there was limited appetite for the senior leadership in their agencies and in the HCT (in Mogadishu/Nairobi) to listen and act upon field team concerns. Again, more authority for decision-making needs to be delegated to the field to ensure action can be taken on issues promptly. This is not only relevant for leadership and coordination, but also on an agency/NGO level for project implementation.
35. The HCT members have committed to allocate more time and attention to their representatives in Puntland and Somaliland, and make efforts to integrate them more fully into planning processes and listen to their concerns. The Action Plan (annex 1) makes a recommendation for a HCT member (representing the HCT) to review sub-national leadership and coordination structures with the view to delegate more authority through a senior Area Management Group (AMG). HCT members have also committed to monthly visits for face-to-face engagement with the teams in these locations. This will go a long way to addressing the concerns that have been raised.

PROTECTION, AAP & PSEA

36. The HCT and humanitarian partners recognise that protection concerns need to be at the centre of the Somalia Humanitarian Crisis. There are diverse protection issues in Somalia, including violations of international humanitarian law, human rights violations comprising gender based violence and child rights violations, and forced displacement. Freedom of movement remains constrained across large areas, as does humanitarian access.
37. There is a commitment from the HC and HCT on the need for senior leadership on protection (see also para. 28). This commitment needs to be brought forward and operationalised. Even though protection is one of the main pillars of the Humanitarian Response Plan, the narrative around the response is very much concentrated around nutritional and food security data and the needs that relate to this. Protection issues are, in reality, lower on the agenda. The 'down-grading' of protection in this manner has reduced the capacity to produce protection related data and analysis that defines the issues that drive people's vulnerabilities and their needs.
38. The HCT needs to embrace the Centrality of Protection concept and demonstrate leadership on agreed protection priorities. The HCT has demonstrated a commitment to protection, and has defined protection

priorities, but there is a consensus that this has not led to progress in action. A higher level protection strategy for the HCT is particularly needed which would revise priorities and provide detailed accountability measures for implementation at the senior level – as opposed to a technical level orientation.

39. The strategy should identify two - three of the most significant protection issues, based on the analysis provided by the protection cluster, that require specific attention and advocacy from the operation's senior leadership (the HCT). Such issues could include the situation of IDPs in Somalia which is a major protection concern. More than 1.1 million people live in protracted displacement across the country, with the majority displaced as a result of forced eviction, violent conflict, and natural disasters. A large number of the displaced suffer from particularly high rates of malnutrition. The situation has been discussed at the HCT and a globally recognised expert has helped to develop a specific IDP plan³. The HCT needs to focus on converting these initial plans into action, with the support of the ICCG and the clusters' operational focus, and ensure all efforts are aimed at providing durable solutions for the challenges faced by IDPs.
40. The return and reintegration of Somali refugees from Dadaab is also a protection issue that needs strong senior leadership. Refugees that are coming back to Somalia will face several challenges when they return to their place of origin, not least an absence of basic services and limited livelihoods opportunities. This has clear implications for unemployment and poverty in general, and more specifically raises the risk of youths being recruited into armed groups. The return process needs to be planned and addressed in a comprehensive manner with all humanitarian partners. The HC needs to make sure there is a consolidated and consistent response for the return and reintegration of refugees, built on protection concerns. The HCT members need to support the HC in this and work as a team to ensure refugees' return and reintegration capitalises on the expertise offered by the range of humanitarian organisations on the ground. The planning and processes for return and reintegration need to be well-communicated and well-coordinated across organisations to address the multiple needs of reintegration.
41. The protection needs in Somalia are significant and varied. The Protection Cluster provides the overall platform for protection coordination, including setting priorities, data collection, analysis, coordinating activities, and providing advice on protection concerns. In addition, and in recognition of the varied protection concerns, there are platforms that cover the specific areas of responsibility (AoR) of child protection, gender based violence, housing land and property and mine action.
42. The Gender Based Violence AoR and Child Protection AoR have relatively disparate work plans which do not come together as a consolidated protection plan within the protection cluster. Notwithstanding the need for issue-specific work plans, a comprehensive strategy for the protection cluster is also needed that brings together the plans of the different AoRs to guide the work of the whole humanitarian response. Such a plan should be aligned with the aforementioned HCT protection strategy (Centrality of Protection) and be based on collective analysis from the cluster and the AoRs.
43. Large protection monitoring programmes and other monitoring mechanisms for GBV and child protection are in place. Individually, these monitoring mechanisms have a specific function, such as supporting advocacy efforts or to inform programmatic responses. For example, the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations of Child Rights (the MRM) has been used to support advocacy work with the HC on issues such as child recruitment. That said, the different monitoring tools and mechanisms are not being utilised to their collective maximum. The different branches of the protection tree do not consolidate their non-sensitive data into a protection overview that allows for collective analysis, programme design and advocacy. A consolidated analysis is fundamental for a robust protection strategy to inform the humanitarian response, and support the HCT in-line with the Centrality of Protection Strategy.
44. Protection mainstreaming is well understood in Somalia but not sufficiently applied in a practical operational manner. There are a range of policies and measures in place at an organisation level on mainstreaming which have helped actors to understand the concept. There was however a sense from non-protection actors that support was required on how to translate various checklists and guidance into practical programmatic design and implementation. The Protection Cluster should be able to provide the necessary support for this. Furthermore, the potential to establish an accountability system to monitor compliance with the mainstreaming requirements should be explored.

³ The plan was developed with leadership from Walter Kälin, scholar, globally renowned expert, and Representative of the United Nations' Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons since 2004.

PSEA

45. At an agency level there is a strong understanding of the need to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation by humanitarian workers. At an organisational level, agencies and NGOs have specific policies and mechanisms to support a PSEA agenda, including codes of conduct that are mandatory for humanitarian workers to sign and abide by; whistle blowing opportunities; and support assistance to survivors. That said, it is more difficult and less likely for small agencies to put a robust PSEA policy process in place. A collective mechanism ensuring consistency and provision for a system-wide approach to PSEA that includes channels to safely report allegations of exploitation and abuse, and programmes that support survivors, would be desirable as per the PSEA task force's recently released guidelines calling for a) all organisations to meet minimum standards on PSEA operational policy; b) that smaller organisations are also catered for in the process; and c) that support is provided to survivors.

AAP

46. Humanitarian actors in Somalia understand the concept of Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) well. A range of organisation-specific measures are in place, although there is a marked variance in the extent to which information from affected people is taken into account to make adjustments to programmes and provide return feedback to the communities. The process of AAP is fragmented and there is a lack of a common collation of community views to influence clusters, inter-cluster operational direction, and HCT strategic planning.

47. The HCT should provide a clear direction on the need to establish a system-wide approach on AAP to support the operational work of the clusters, the ICCG, and the HCT at the strategic level. This does not need the establishment of a heavy structure for collective AAP, but a simpler system that brings information together from different actors, through the clusters, and to the ICCG. The ICCG should be tasked to identify a means of bringing information together from different partners to help the response adapt its approach, priorities and strategic direction based on feedback from communities. The role of national and local NGOs will be critical in such a system as the vast majority of programme implementation and service delivery is done by these organisations. They have easier access to the field and maintain close contact with the populations they are assisting. They can provide an effective conduit for AAP and provide community feedback to the senior leadership of the response and the operational ICCG.

EL NINO, PROGRAMMES & DELIVERY

48. The El Niño phenomenon brought floods and drought at different times and in different locations in Somalia earlier this year. The Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) early warning system worked extremely well in regard to the floods. It predicted the climatic anomalies and the subsequent flood threat which allowed preparedness measures to be taken on time, including rehabilitating broken riverbanks and establishing alternative cropping patterns to cope with the flooding.

49. The drought situation was also predicted through early warning mechanisms, but the response was not as well planned or timely as for the flooding. The Federal Authorities in Puntland issued an appeal for assistance in December 2015, while the international humanitarian community launched the 'Call for Aid' in March, 2016. While this may raise eyebrows and bring allegations of a slow response from the international side vis-à-vis local authorities, there is a clear belief in the international humanitarian community that the earlier appeal, while correct in hindsight, was not based on sufficient credible evidence. It was considered a wish list and the humanitarian community opted to wait for accurate data from the Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit (FSNAU) to be released rather than "jumping to conclusions".

50. Working closely with FEWSNET (Famine Early Warning System), the Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit (FSNAU) releases a range of high quality information products, including standard quarterly bulletins and semi-annual comprehensive reports (*post Gu* and *post Deyr* season assessments). These are recognized as products of the highest caliber, but there is growing recognition amongst stakeholders that in the future, the seasonal assessments should be complemented by more agile and quicker assessment tools and products that give a technically sound and evidence-based indication of the evolution of a specific situation on the ground in real time (or as close to real time as possible). The case of Puntland in early 2016 is a good example. Humanitarian actors were waiting for 'a number' from FSNAU before taking action even though the drought crisis was worsening during this period. Equally, donors were waiting for the same

'number' to justify the release of funds. Unfortunately in the case of a slow onset drought emergency, there is a time-lag involved in changes to nutritional data or food security information i.e. the drought is happening, but the tangible change in nutritional or food security status will only appear at a later date. This suggests two important lessons. On the one hand, there is a need to develop rapid granular assessments in the earlier phases of a slow-onset drought crisis and secondly, donors and humanitarian organisations need to have a stronger commitment to respond quickly on a no regrets basis, based on early warning predictions, rather than waiting for changes in food security indicators or nutritional data scores, in order to respond in time to a serious drought situation. There is an increasingly widely held view that the FSNAU should add this functionality to its existing suite of information tools (flexible, real-time assessments to report on specific situations and crises).

51. Agencies were able to address some of the needs of drought affected communities, through re-allocating funds, and donors allowed for some flexibility to permit this when the gravity of the situation was apparent. But there is still a feeling that the response was "too little and too late".
52. Responding effectively to a slow onset emergency such as a drought is about implementing the right intervention at the right time of the drought cycle. Droughts and floods are recurrent and largely predictable in Somalia, and the HCT needs to provide clear strategic direction to the ICCG to develop and implement seasonal and livelihood-based preparedness plans to ensure the right interventions are implemented at the right time for predictable (although variable in scale) situations and needs.
53. Furthermore, in a region where climatic variations bring droughts and floods on a regular basis, humanitarians need to learn from the past and retain an institutional memory of successful and failed interventions. Somalia (and other countries in the region) suffered famine in 2011 which catalysed a series of high level conferences to make sure that predictable crises would be anticipated and addressed before escalating to a scale and intensity that would threaten the lives of people. These conferences brought IGAD and the African Union together with Heads of State of numerous countries in the region to develop the Horn of Africa Plan of Action (HoA PoA), an elaboration of a framework originally developed jointly by WFP, FAO and Oxfam. The HoA PoA articulated a framework for drought preparedness and response. Similarly, the Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid (CordAid) and the International Institute for Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) designed a drought cycle management tool kit in response to the famine in 2011 for a similar purpose. These tools identify how to respond to slow onset drought crises programmatically and from a planning perspective. It is important to hold on to lessons from the past, and better manage and retain the knowledge that exists. The clusters are well-positioned for this type of knowledge management, and are well-positioned to share information on lessons learned with partners to make sure they are acted upon. These lessons from the past, and tools for the present can also influence how donors support organisations in a timely manner to respond to crises such as those catalyzed by the El Niño phenomenon.
54. The HCT has a significant role in prioritising action based on early warning signals. Early warning works on the principle of 'no regret' and the leadership of the response needs to communicate clearly to organisations and to donors that early action is needed to avert a crisis. Even if the crisis does not occur, this should not be seen as a poor prioritization, it should be seen as proactive and far-sighted, and a demonstration of good leadership. This clear direction and commitment also needs to be backed up by clear plans and an effective rapid response mechanism which includes the ability to do rapid needs assessments, stock pile accordingly, and have a mechanism to release funds rapidly. Donors need to be engaged in these discussions early.

NATIONAL ACTORS

55. All humanitarian actors acknowledge the important role played by national NGOs and local authorities in delivering humanitarian assistance. But their importance is not limited to accessing communities and delivering assistance in areas where it is difficult for international organisations to work in. Their proximity to beneficiaries is also crucial to understanding the needs of communities and providing feedback on needs, the appropriateness of the response, and any changes that are required to programmes. National NGOs bring contextual knowledge that is vital to guiding strategic decisions and the direction of the response. They are paramount to delivering an effective humanitarian response and should be treated on an equal footing as international organisations where they have demonstrated their work to be carried out in a neutral and impartial manner.
56. National NGOs are, however, used as sub-contractors most of the time rather than as equal partners. There are many reasons for this. The capacity of national NGOs to manage grants and report professionally is often questioned. And in Somalia, national NGOs are tainted by allegations of financial mismanagement of funds, particularly emanating from the 2011 famine period where donor money was more readily available and monitoring was insufficient to fully account for the assistance the humanitarian community was providing (often through national NGOs). These concerns need to be addressed as part of the implementation of the localisation agenda, as agreed during the World Humanitarian Summit.

57. The capacity of national actors in Somalia, including authorities, is grossly under assessed, and in many cases, unknown. Measures need to be put in place to assess and regularly review and support, over a prolonged period, national NGO capacities, and establish a capacity development plan for national NGOs that promotes equal partnership as a principle. Such a plan should be comprehensive and support national NGOs to manage the day-to-day operations of an NGO such as grant management, reporting, and financial accountability, as well as understand the more traditional issues that 'we' tend to provide training on, such as humanitarian principles, international humanitarian law etc.
58. The Somalia Risk Management Unit has established a set of criteria which national NGOs have to satisfy in order to qualify for grants from international organisations and/or directly from donors. There is a widespread belief that these conditions are too restrictive and the criteria should be reviewed to allow more national NGO partners to be engaged in the response. There was also a call to review the cases of national NGOs that did not meet the criteria and are excluded from receiving grants. This should be done bi-annually to illustrate a commitment to support national capacity and to benefit from additional active national NGOs in the response.

PROGRAMMING

59. The protracted nature of the crisis in Somalia requires a response to address humanitarian and transitional medium-term programming simultaneously. Likewise, the situation is not homogenous in all parts of the country and programming should be appropriate to the situation and needs, and should be adjusted accordingly. The commitment from HCT members to delegate more authority to agency and NGO representatives in the Federal States should help in this regard.
60. This report has referenced the multiple challenges and complexities of responding to crises in Somalia. The breadth of issues that require attention range from core 'life-saving' humanitarian challenges, state building efforts, a security and stabilization agenda, and longer-term development activities aimed at basic service provision and poverty reduction. Consequently there are a number of strategic plans to address multiple issues: the Humanitarian Response Plan, the Integrated Strategic Framework, the National Development Plan (being finalized), a five-year development plan for Puntland, and a number of multi-year resilience funds supported by donors and implemented by different NGO consortiums. It is not clear, however, how these plans complement each other and how humanitarian funding, development funding, resilience funds and other streams complement each other.
61. The HCT needs to demonstrate its leadership and articulate linkages between these plans to bridge various dynamics and programme cycles to ensure humanitarian and development activities are mutually reinforcing.
62. Programming in Somalia remains fragmented and sector driven, to a large degree because the HRP is structured as such, and the potential cumulative effect of multi-purpose/sector interventions has not been unfolded. The HRP will remain a sectorised plan, but humanitarian actors need to retain flexibility to the extent possible and plan and programme according to people's needs rather than sectorally and restricted by the confines of a HRP template.
63. Communities affected by the El Niño phenomenon typically require multiple types of assistance. Humanitarian organisations should look at opportunities to carry out joint analyses as a precursor for joint programming that would provide the possibility for different types of assistance to be delivered at the same time to the same people.
64. Cash programming is considered to have the potential to support the different needs of disaster-affected communities in a consolidated manner. Cash programming has been a mainstay of humanitarian programmes in Somalia for many years, the Somali people are used to it, and several cash transfer systems and technologies are in place to that effect (see para. 23). Consequently, the HCT needs to consider the potential to expand the scale of cash programming in Somalia. But it needs to be done in a way that capitalizes on current mechanisms and avoids setting up alternative or parallel systems. And it needs to be done in a coordinated and harmonized manner that avoids overburdening beneficiaries with multiple cash cards, voucher systems, mobile money solutions, bank transfers (where banks exist).
65. A coordination platform or working group would help bring clarity on certain issues related to cash programming. There is currently a lack of interaction between various actors on issues related to market analyses; potential risks and protection concerns faced by beneficiaries in the instance of a one-time cash transfer of a significant amount; the benefits of multipurpose cash, conditional versus unconditional cash transfers, restricted cash versus unrestricted etc. These issues need to be discussed as a precursor to scaling up cash assistance. There is a belief that cash assistance is appropriate as a delivery modality, but the argument needs to be convincing and needs to include suggestions on the optimal way to deliver cash in accordance with the needs and desires of beneficiaries.
66. It is strongly suggested that the most advanced agency(ies) or sectors take a lead on the issue and provide suggestions to the HCT on how to take cash programming forward for the HCT to endorse an official position.

ANNEX I: ACTION PLAN - HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM (HCT)

FOCUS AREA: LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

POSITIVES

- There is a functioning HCT: it meets regularly, produces minutes, and provides strategic guidance to operational actors.
- The HCT membership is broad and inclusive with UN agencies, international NGOs, the NGO consortium, national NGOs and traditional and non-traditional donors,
- The HCT and the inter-cluster coordination group meet quarterly to reflect the connections between the strategic leadership and the operational delivery of the response.
- The ICCG regularly raises issues to HCT for consideration
- Despite the complexities of the crisis and insecure operating environment, DSS provides a supportive advisory service to the Designated Official (DO) to facilitate agencies and NGOs ability to move as freely as possible (when possible) and the deliver assistance.

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
FOCUS AREA: LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION				
Insufficient spirit of togetherness, team approach, and commitment to collective action	All actors involved in the humanitarian response feel that they are part of a team effort to respond collectively to the humanitarian needs of people in Somalia.	Build on the momentum of the STAIT mission and a rejuvenated commitment of 'togetherness' and organise a HCT retreat as soon as possible to discuss the next steps.	HCT	Nov. 2016
	A common vision for the humanitarian response identifies clear roles for agencies and NGOs in their area of expertise	The HCT will develop a Compact for mutual accountability . The Compact will be a mechanism for two-way mutual accountability between the HC and HCT members.	HCT (support from OCHA HLSU, Geneva)	Jan. 2017
		Revise the HCT's ToRs to include clearer guidance on members' respective responsibilities and mutual accountability (see above, also). The ToR should incorporate the Principles of Partnership (equality, transparency, results-oriented approach, responsibility and complementarity), to ensure that each member of the HCT is treated equally, contributes equally, and is held accountable for their contribution to collective results. It should also clearly define the respective roles and responsibilities of the HCT and ICCG.	HCT (drafting by OCHA)	Dec. 2016
		Organize a light self-assessment of the HCT's collective performance in achieving agreed results, annually.	HCT, STAIT, HLSU	Apr. 2017
		Mogadishu should be the default location for HCT meetings, and conversations on strategic issues should be carried out	HC/HCT	Nov. 2016 and on-going

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
		<p>face to face. An appropriate venue will be utilised that provides easier access for NGOs in the HCT.</p> <p>The HC and HCT members will commit to more engagement with the representation in the regions such as Somaliland and Puntland. At least one member of the HCT should undertake a representative role (on behalf of the HCT) and visit the humanitarian teams in at least two of the regional offices once per month.</p>	HC/HCT	Nov. 2016 and on-going
<p>Insufficient engagement and strategic direction from the HCT on specific issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Principled humanitarian approach: creating the space for humanitarian action based on needs and working on access to all areas despite the complexities of the situation. ▪ Coordination and communication for the Dadaab returns and reintegration. ▪ Senior leadership on Protection and a collective approach on Accountability to Affected People (AAP) ▪ Linkages between humanitarian and development actors 	<p>Strong engagement, and clear strategic direction provided by the HCT and specific HCT members on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The importance of humanitarian principles and humanitarian action in Somalia: a clear direction on access and delivery despite the complexities of the operation: leave nobody behind. ▪ Dadaab returns and reintegration ▪ Senior leadership on protection & AAP ▪ The importance of development alongside humanitarian operations for resilience and provide basic services. <p>HCT members are contributing analysis and suggestions on specific issues relating to their technical area of expertise to help build a common position on certain issues, e.g. FAO (not only) on seasonal planning and preparedness for drought.</p> <p>Position papers to be shared broadly, but particularly with the inter-cluster group (ICCG) and sub-national teams.</p>	<p>Develop a common and shared vision for humanitarian action.</p> <p>Develop a schedule of key strategic issues for discussion and decisions by the HCT. Provide the schedule for discussion (and decisions) 4-6 weeks in advance of any meetings to allow HCT members to prepare the agenda items, prepare an analysis of the issue, and bring issues to the table for the HCT to consider.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relevant HCT members lead and contribute analysis and suggestions on specific topics requiring a strategic common position. <p>Increase the frequency of HCT meeting: bi-monthly</p> <p>Agree on a more streamlined HCT agenda format that is limited to a small number of items to allow for in-depth discussion and decisions: (a) one-two strategic issues per meeting; (b) take up issues brought to the table by the ICCG and (c) any other business.</p> <p>Sequencing of HCT and ICCG meetings: the ICCG should meet prior to the HCT to ensure operational issues contribute to the HCT agenda and subsequently provide strategic direction for the operational response (to the ICCG)</p>	<p>HCT</p> <p>HCT</p> <p>HCT</p> <p>HCT, OCHA, Global Cluster Coordination Group (GCC)</p> <p>HCT/ICWG, GCC</p>	<p>Dec. 2016</p> <p>Nov. 2016</p> <p>Nov. 2016 and on-going</p> <p>Nov. 2016 and on-going</p> <p>Nov. 2016 and on-going</p>
<p>The Somalia humanitarian story is insufficiently communicated which has an impact on resource mobilisation and advocacy.</p>	<p>The humanitarian story is articulated clearly and critical humanitarian issues are clearly defined alongside and distinct from the political and development issues in the country.</p>	<p>Produce a robust communication and resource mobilisation plan. Utilise traditional media and social media to broadcast the humanitarian story in Somalia.</p> <p>Utilise the communications resources of different agencies and NGOs to produce feature stories and human stories that</p>	<p>HCT/ Inter-Agency Comms resources</p> <p>HCT members and agency</p>	<p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p>

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
		<p>highlight unmet needs, the gravity of the situation, and the need for humanitarian assistance alongside and distinct from political and development issues.</p> <p>HCT members use the humanitarian storyline and media attention to work on resource mobilisation, including joint (small) teams engaging together with donors, and travelling to capitals as agreed.</p>	<p>comms resources</p> <p>HCT members</p>	<p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p>
Insufficient cluster representation by some Cluster Lead Agency Reps	Agency Representatives with a cluster lead role represent the cluster (and its members) responsibilities equally with their agency responsibilities in the HCT.	Agency representatives with a cluster lead role will engage regularly (several times per week) with the Cluster Coordinator to keep well-informed of cluster issues brought by the cluster members.	Cluster Lead Agency Reps & Cluster Coordinators	Nov. 2016
UN centric approach – insufficient consideration of INGO contributions	NGOs are well integrated into all aspects of the response and fully respected: setting strategy, decision-making, co-leading clusters, and meeting regularly with the HC and at HCT meetings.	<p>NGOs' suggestions are given equal consideration for the agenda at HCT meetings alongside UN agencies and NGOs are given equal time on the floor as UN agency representatives at HCT meetings.</p> <p>Reach out to NGOs in the Federal States to ensure they are engaged in the coordinated response.</p>	<p>HCT / NGO Consortium / NGOs</p> <p>OCHA</p>	<p>Nov. 2016 and on-going</p> <p>Jan. 2017</p>
<p>Leadership and coordination in the Federal States (such as Puntland, Somaliland)</p> <p>A senior level platform for joint strategic planning and decision-making is functioning inadequately (or does not exist) at the sub-national level.</p>	<p>The coordination structure in both the Federal States will be established / strengthened and will develop joint plans and make strategic decisions with delegated authority from the HCT.</p> <p>The senior level leadership and coordination platform in the Federal Member States will be engaging emphatically with NGOs partners and will be working demonstrably as a 'team'.</p>	<p>Review the existing leadership and coordination platforms in the Federal States.</p> <p>As per the outcome of the review on leadership and coordination in the Federal States, institute a Senior Area Management Group (AMG), or similar, that includes senior managers from UN/NGOs to lead coordination on humanitarian and development issues in Puntland and Somaliland. The correct leadership of this group needs to be identified, and one suggestion is for the AMG to be co-chaired by one UN and one NGO rep. The RCO, OCHA and the NGO Consortium will identify the detail for the leadership, functioning and chairmanship of the sub-national structure.</p> <p>The leadership and coordination structure at the Federal level will be delegated to develop their own sub-national plans and fully contribute to plans and national assessments such as the HRP and HNO as equal partners (not only provide input to a draft).</p>	<p>HCT, OCHA, GCC</p> <p>HC/HCT, GCC</p> <p>HC, OCHA, GCC</p>	<p>Jan. 2017</p> <p>Feb. 2017</p> <p>Mar. 2017</p>

FOCUS AREA: AAP AND PROTECTION

POSITIVES

- There are organisational mechanisms in place on AAP with a strong commitment from local actors
- There is a strong understanding on protection issues across humanitarian actors, including PSEA
- There is a demonstrable commitment from the HC and HCT on the need for senior leadership on protection
- There is extensive protection monitoring and advocacy taking place at an organisational level
- The HRP reflects protection as a key pillar in the response

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
FOCUS AREA: AAP AND PROTECTION				
Absence of HCT protection strategy that identifies high priority protection issues requiring high level advocacy and action (Centrality of Protection)	<p>Centrality of Protection Strategy identifies high priority protection issues requiring high level advocacy and action.</p> <p>Advocacy plans are in place to bring the highest priority protection issues to the attention of relevant and well-positioned 'duty bearers' to take action.</p> <p>People affected by the crisis, particularly conflict and insecurity are better protected, and their rights are better protected, than the situation currently.</p>	<p>Identify high priority protection issues and develop a Centrality of Protection Strategy. The CoP Strategy will identify the highest priority protection issues, suggest actions to be taken, and identify agencies or NGOs to lead on specific parts of the strategy.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Verify the existing protection priorities are relevant, highest priority, and need (or do not need) to be amended. <p>HCT will hold dedicated meetings on Protection every three months.</p>	<p>HCT (supported by Protection Cluster), Global Protection Cluster (GPC), ProCap possibility</p> <p>HCT</p>	<p>Feb. 2017</p> <p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p>
Need for an overarching evidence-based and analytical protection strategy that relates to other planning process (e.g. HRP, NDP)	<p>An over-arching, evidence-based and analytical strategy relates to other plans that support the humanitarian operation, stability, and development in Somalia i.e. it is not a stand-alone plan.</p> <p>There is a clear understanding how protection relates to other parts of the humanitarian response, and how all agencies can integrate protection into their work.</p>	<p>Consolidate existing strategies from different protection groups (clusters plus AORs) into a more analytical and overarching protection strategy that also illustrates how it links to the broader humanitarian response.</p>	<p>Protection Cluster and Sub Clusters, GPC and AoRs</p>	<p>Jan. 2017</p>
Lack of <i>consolidated</i> protection monitoring; information for	<p>Information from different protection monitoring projects and mechanisms,</p>	<p>Identify information opportunities that can be shared within the protection cluster for trends analysis on protection, child</p>	<p>Prot. Cluster (and sub</p>	<p>Dec. 2016</p>

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
<p>analysis, programme design and advocacy e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protection monitoring, GBV monitoring Information Mgmt. System, Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Child Rights Violations). 	<p><u>when not considered too sensitive</u>, is consolidated and analysed and supports strategic decision-making, operational direction, and mainstreaming protection into programme design; and contributes to a stronger application of protection to people that need it.</p>	<p>protection, GBV, human rights violations, on a quarterly basis.</p> <p>Disseminate protection analysis (see point immediately above) with the HCT, the ICCG, the individual clusters, and the Humanitarian Forum.</p>	<p>clusters), GPC</p> <p>Prot. Cluster, sub clusters, HCT.</p>	<p>March. 2017 and on-going</p>
<p>Gender and Protection mainstreaming into all sectors lacks consistency and is insufficiently linked to the programme cycle and the broader humanitarian operation (assessments, programme design, and disaggregation)</p>	<p>Humanitarian actors in the response are planning and implementing programmes which address the specific needs of diverse groups.</p> <p>Humanitarian actors in the response are successfully mainstreaming protection into their programmes so the rights and dignity of affected people are protected as a matter of course.</p>	<p>Workshops are held with the clusters to present case study examples on gender and protection mainstreaming, to illustrate exactly what it is.</p> <p>Establish a 'self-assessment' exercise and project sampling a audit system to monitor the degree to which gender and protection mainstreaming is applied.</p>	<p>Protection cluster, GPC, GENCAP</p> <p>Protection cluster, GPC⁴</p>	<p>Feb. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Mar. 2017 and on-going</p>
<p>There is a fragmented approach to AAP; lack of a common feedback mechanism to influence HCT strategic planning and ICCG operational function.</p>	<p>Common mechanism in place to bring together the individual efforts of agencies and NGOs on AAP to provide the HCT with a common picture of the feedback on the response from people affected by Somalia's crises, and how the response can be adapted.</p> <p>The HCT takes into account feedback from affected people to adjust its strategic guidance. The ICCG is appropriately informed by HCT strategic guidance for its operational function.</p>	<p>Focal points in the clusters bring together feedback from different cluster partners and at the inter-cluster level, come together to consolidate feedback from all clusters to provide a common picture for the HCT.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify key issues and broad trends for the attention of the HCT (and for adjustments to cluster plans). AAP Focal Points collate information from all clusters, analyse it and present the 'collective feedback' to the HCT every quarter. Clusters present key issues and minimum steps required to address issues that have been brought up by people affected by the crises in the country. <p>Identify training opportunities on AAP for interested people and share good practices with the HCT.</p>	<p>Cluster Focal Points & ICCG, IASC AAP/PSEA Task Team</p> <p>HCT, IASC AAP /PSEA Task Team</p>	<p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Jan. 2017</p>

⁴ The need to recruit outside expertise may be necessary to develop such methodology, for which the role of the Global Protection Cluster may be requested.

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
<p>Lack of a systematic approach to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) by humanitarians</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of a collective mechanism for recording and following up on issues of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) to ensure 	<p>A collective mechanism exists whereby reports of sexual exploitation and abuse are recorded and any humanitarian workers that are accused of such behaviour are investigated and will be held accountable under the rule of law.</p> <p>The humanitarian community, under the leadership of the HC employs a zero tolerance approach on PSEA.</p>	<p>All humanitarian organisations review, amend or establish minimum internal organisational standards on SEA, as required.</p> <p>Canvas existing PSEA policy and standards with gaps analysis and development of plan</p> <p>Establish a feedback and complaints mechanism for reporting SEA and raise awareness with local communities on how to report, provide feedback and make complaints about the conduct of humanitarian workers.</p>	<p>All humanitarian actors, IASC AAP/PSEA Task Team Prot. Cluster and GBV sub-cluster</p> <p>All humanitarian actors, HCT, Prot. Cluster and GBV sub-cluster</p>	<p>Dec. 2016</p> <p>Feb. 2017</p> <p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p>

FOCUS AREA: EL NINO, PREPAREDNESS AND PROGRAMME

POSITIVES

- There is a substantial capacity for early warning, assessments and analytical expertise in the food security and nutrition sector (FSNAU/SWALIM); and there is a firm agreement on the need for preparedness as a priority.
- It is possible to reprogramming funds in emergency situations (flexibility is exercised by some donors), and standby contingency funds available for El Nino-related needs
- It appears that resilience-based programming is more widely recognised as an effective way to address immediate needs and contribute to addressing the underlying causes of crises; there is recognition that longer-term planning is the way forward (NDP, 3-year humanitarian strategy, IDP durable solutions)
- There are many examples of successful and innovative use of technology for programming and monitoring in the country over several years.
- There is a depth of experience in cash programming from several years of implementing programmes at scale.
- The strength of the private sector and the diaspora is recognised and the humanitarian response needs to capitalise on this;
- National NGOs are strongly involved in the response, although not as involved in the strategic planning of the response.
- The Access Task Force exists and has a strong focus on bureaucratic impediments on the ability of humanitarians to deliver assistance.

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
FOCUS AREA: EL NINO, PREPAREDNESS AND PROGRAMME				
Lack of preparedness plans, rapid response mechanisms for sudden onset issues, and seasonal-based joint planning and programming	Preparedness plans, a rapid response mechanism for slow onset issues, and a seasonal based planning tools are in place that will allow the HCT to prepare for crises in a predictable way, mitigate their impact, and respond in a timely manner.	HCT provides clear strategic guidance to the ICCG to produce accessible analysis on climatic conditions , develop clear actionable plans and preparedness measure to mitigate the impact of predictable drought and floods in regard to climate-related disasters.	HCT/ ICCG	Dec. 2016
		<u>El Niño drought</u> . Learn from the past. Do not reinvent the wheel: Promote and utilise existing drought cycle management tool-kit for the Greater Horn of Africa (IIRR and CordAid) that has been used effectively in previous droughts in Somalia and adapt it to support preparedness plans.	HCT, ICCG, FSC	Dec. 2016 and on-going
		<u>El Niño drought and flood</u> : Ensure that the multi-year humanitarian strategy includes a climatic seasonal calendar approach to ensure preparedness and response measures relate to (expected) seasonal climatic fluctuations.	ICCG, FSC	Dec. 2016
		<u>El Niño floods / sudden onset disasters</u> : Preparedness plan for floods: given the seasonality of floods (annual), identify short-term and long-term interventions and develop a preparedness plan including advocacy messages targeting donors.	ICCG, FSC	Apr. 2017

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
		<p><u>El Niño floods / sudden onset disasters</u>: Establish a rapid response mechanism (rapid needs assessment, stock piling, rapid delivery of funding for response). Engage with donors to provide the funds in a rapid manner.</p> <p>Develop additional light and nimble assessments (with analysis) to complement FSNAU seasonal bi-annual assessments/reports.</p>	<p>ICCG, FSC, HCT (engage with donors)</p> <p>FSC</p>	<p>Apr. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Jan. 2017</p>
<p>Inadequate integrated analytical framework and inadequate livelihood-based programming</p>	<p>Plans are informed by strong and well-informed analysis, and programmes address the needs of the people.</p> <p>In relation to the El Niño phenomenon, the needs of the people are diverse and require multi-sector support, with an emphasis on livelihoods-based programming particularly for pastoralist communities.</p>	<p>Establish <u>and manage</u> an integrated analytical framework which all clusters contribute to. The analytical framework should identify threats, risks and opportunities and should be season-sensitive and use existing livelihoods baseline profiles in Somalia.</p> <p>Promote joint (multi-sector and multi-year) projects and programmes in the HRP that will allow affected people (or people that will be affected in terms of preparedness measures) to receive multi-sectoral assistance at the same time, or in a coordinated manner. NOTE: multi-purpose cash can be considered useful in this regard, and an expansion of the Scope modality provides a platform for this.</p>	<p>ICCG, all clusters</p> <p>ICCG, all clusters</p>	<p>Feb. 2017 (and link to the HRP cycle thereafter)</p> <p>Nov. 2016</p>
<p>Lack of connectedness between various multi-year projects and strategies</p>	<p>Humanitarian plans relate to and capitalise on other processes which are being implemented in Somalia to try to make sure humanitarian operations provide a foundation for development, and development activities contribute to resilience, disaster risk reduction, and poverty reduction.</p> <p>Humanitarian plans can work alongside (and linked with) the Integrated Strategic Framework, the forthcoming National Development Plan for Somalia, multi-year plans in the Federal States (Puntland), and donor-driven resilience plans.</p>	<p>Clarify the needs of people in Somalia and carry out an interlocking exercise that identifies how the different plans relate to, and support each other, and support the needs of the people. Adapt plans and programmes as necessary and eradicate overlaps between humanitarian operations, development activities and the state building effort, and make sure plans and activities are complementary.</p>	<p>HCT, UNCT, OCHA, RCO, UNSOM</p>	<p>Dec. 2016</p>
<p>Insufficient presence of development actors on the</p>	<p>Development actors support resilience building measure and other approaches</p>	<p>Establish a joint humanitarian-development platform of UN agencies and NGOs to advocate for more development</p>	<p>HCT, UNCT, RCO</p>	<p>Feb. 2017</p>

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
ground	which will start to address some of the root causes of the crises that affect Somalia (<i>WHS: moving from delivering aid to ending need</i>).	<p>presence, activities, and funding to build resilience, contribute to development, and start the process of moving away from delivering aid to ending need.</p> <p>Establish a clear narrative on development needs and the importance of development to move away from delivering humanitarian assistance to support national capacity deliver basic services and support communities to build their resilience and develop robust coping strategies. The narrative will be used to underpin resource mobilisation efforts and will be pinned to the need to fund the National Development Plan.</p>	UNCT, RCO, comms capacity in agencies and NGOs.	Feb. 2017 and on-going
National NGOs: often used as part of risk transfer strategy rather than equal partners; Lack of a strategy for capacity building;	<p>National NGO capacity is harnessed to ensure their expertise and contextual knowledge is fully integrated into strategic thinking and planning.</p> <p>International actors engage with national NGOs in the spirit of equal partnership (not as a sub-contractor).</p> <p>International actors are supporting capacity development of national NGOs substantially to help build them to a level where they can be applying for funding directly from donors and can manage the day-to-day running of an NGO and cope with the complex demands of donor reporting, organisational accounting, financial management etc.</p>	<p>Establish a more practical (achievable) set of criteria for national NGOs to be used as partners, and revisit every six months national NGOs that have not achieved the eligibility criteria to re-assess their application.</p> <p>Establish a special allocation on national NGO capacity building in the SHF.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HCT/UNCT members share their experiences and good practice in building capacity in the last ten years. ▪ OCHA Finance Unit and other partners to sit with donors to elaborate funding requirement and modalities for a 'special allocation for capacity building' and the time-frame for funding that provides a foundation for annual humanitarian response (fund early to build the foundations). <p>Establish more and stronger linkages between donors and national NGOs</p>	<p>HCT, ICCG, OCHA (Finance Unit), Risk Mgmt. Unit, donors</p> <p>HCT, UNCT, UNDP, ICCG, OCHA Finance Unit, Donors</p> <p>HCT, NGO Consortium, donors</p>	<p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Feb. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p>

Issue/Problem	Expected Outcome	Action	Who	When
Divergent approaches to cash programming, and potential risk, including protection.	Cash programming is more harmonized and delivered through a multi-purpose wallet approach in-line with the requirements of crisis-affected communities.	<p>HCT provides clear strategic direction on the use of cash (informed by the ICCG and leading agencies and NGOs on cash programming): purpose, scale, preferred delivery modality, cash coordination.</p> <p>Related to the point, immediately above: establish a coordination platform (or technical working group) to get a clear picture on different cash programming modalities, coverage, operational actors, scale, and advocate for a more harmonized approach to cash as a delivery modality.</p> <p>Capitalise on the Scope platform for cash programming which has the potential for multi-purpose cash programming.</p>	<p>HCT, ICCG, all clusters</p> <p>HCT, ICCG, WFP, CaLP, CashCAP possibility</p> <p>WFP and humanitarian actors</p>	<p>Jan. 2017</p> <p>Jan. 2017 and on-going</p> <p>Jan. 2017</p>
Focus of the access task force is on the bureaucratic impediments to access. There is less attention on dealing with access to conflict affected and contested areas.	<p>The Access Task Force tracks and has clear information on access across Somalia including bureaucratic impediments and impediments linked to insecurity and contested areas.</p> <p>Access Task Force advocates for <u>practical approaches</u> to deliver assistance wherever it is required.</p>	<p>HCT to provide clear strategic direction on their requirements on access as a broad issue. The HCT needs to guide the Access Task Force on its requirements regarding access. The HCT needs to understand the bureaucratic impediments to delivering assistance, <u>and</u> form a clear understanding of access impediments (and opportunities) in contested areas, and the scale of the problem. The Access Task Force should continue its excellent work and do more on access to contested areas.</p> <p>Incoming DHC to develop a strategy on addressing humanitarian access (bureaucratic and in contested areas).</p>	<p>HCT, ICCG, Access Task Force</p> <p>DHC (incoming), HCT, Access Task Force</p>	<p>Dec. 2016</p> <p>Jan. 2017</p>

ANNEX II: SCHEDULE OF THE MISSION

Day 1	Wednesday 14 September/ Mogadishu & Nairobi
Bilateral meeting, Head of Office and Deputy Head of Office, OCHA	
Bilateral meeting, Humanitarian Coordinator	
Self-assessment, Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)	
Day 1	Wednesday 14 September/ Mogadishu
Bilateral meeting, OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officer / Civil-Military Coordination	
Bilateral meeting, Country Director, Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
Day 1	Wednesday 14 September/ Nairobi
Bilateral meeting, OCHA Regional Office	
Day 2	Thursday 15 September / Mogadishu & Nairobi
Self-Assessment, Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG)	
Day 2	Thursday 15 September / Mogadishu
Bilateral meeting, OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Access Team	
Bilateral meeting, Country Director, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	
Bilateral meeting, Head of Programme, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	
Day 2	Thursday 15 September / Nairobi
Lunch meeting with donors	
Day 3	Friday 16 September / Mogadishu & Nairobi
Focus Group meeting, Protection Cluster	
Day 3	Friday 16 September / Mogadishu
Bilateral meeting, AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit	
Bilateral meeting, UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	
Day 3	Friday 16 September / Nairobi
Focus Group meeting, Information Management Working Group	
Bilateral meeting, World Vision Somalia	
Bilateral meeting, CARE International Somalia	
Focus Group meeting, Shelter Cluster	
Focus Group meeting, Education Cluster	
Focus Group meeting, Gender-Based Violence AOR	
Self-assessment, International NGO	
Bilateral meeting, WFP Regional Office	
Bilateral meeting, UNICEF Regional Office	
Bilateral meeting, UNFPA Somalia	
Day 4	Saturday 17 September / Mogadishu
Bilateral meeting, Somalia Disaster Management Agency, SoDMA	
Bilateral meeting, Cash Focal Points (Working Group)	
Self-assessment, National NGO	

Day 5 | Sunday 18 September / Garowe, Puntland

Garowe Humanitarian Team (Cluster, agencies, NGOs)

Day 5 | Sunday 18 September / Hargeisa, Somaliland

Hargeisa Humanitarian Team self-assessment and focusgroup discussion

Day 6 | Monday 19 September / Garowe, Hargeisa

Garowe Field Mission

Hargeisa, Field Mission

Day 7 | Tuesday 20 September / Garowe, Puntland

Garowe Humanitarian Team focusgroup discussion

Day 7 | Tuesday 20 September / Mogadishu

Bilateral Meeting, Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

Bilateral Meeting, International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

Day 8 | Wednesday 21 September / Nairobi

Focus Group Meeting, Gender Theme Group

Bilateral meeting, WHO Somalia

Bilateral meeting, Action Contre La Faim (ACF) Somalia

Bilateral meeting, IOM Regional Office

Bilateral meeting, ICRC Regional Office

Bilateral meeting, NRC Regional Office

Bilateral Meeting, USAID

Bilateral Meeting, UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

Bilateral Meeting, UNHCR Somalia

Bilateral Meeting, UNHCR Regional Service Centre

Bilateral Meeting, OCHA Humanitarian Finance Unit

Bilateral Meeting, WFP Somalia

Bilateral Meeting, UK Department for International Development (DFID)

Day 10 | Friday 23 September / Nairobi

Humanitarian Country Team Retreat

ANNEX III: STAIT MISSION TERMS OF REFERENCE

BACKGROUND

The Emergency Directors Group established the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) to support them in rolling-out the Transformative Agenda (TA) to the field. Through the preparation and dissemination of communications materials, remote support to Humanitarian Country Teams (HCT) and through a number of country support missions, the STAIT seeks to impart the “spirit” of the TA to foster more collaborative, effective, transparent and accountable ways for humanitarian actors to work together.

The STAIT’s aim is to support the Humanitarian Coordinator and HCT to deliver an effective response ensuring people affected by the humanitarian crisis receive the assistance they need, and that humanitarian assistance contributes to stability, resilience and lays the ground for longer-term development objectives.

In consultation with the Emergency Directors and on the invitation of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the STAIT was asked to carry out a mission to Somalia to provide a diagnostics of the response in terms of leadership and coordination, delivery and accountability to affected people (AAP). The team was particularly asked to frame the mission in relation to preparedness and response for the El Niño drought, and subsequent flooding that affected the Federal States, Puntland and Somaliland. STAIT missions also pay attention to core operational issues of protection, linkages between humanitarian, recovery and development programming, security risk management and access, and delivery modalities.

TERMS OF REFERENCE: STAIT MISSION TO SOMALIA

The Emergency Director’s Group (EDG) requested the STAIT to undertake a mission to Somalia to support the humanitarian system-wide response to its various crises. In the last twelve months Somalia has received refugees fleeing from the Yemen crisis; seasonal floods that displaced 18,000 thousand people in April, and more in October (el niño); cyclones; and armed conflict that displaced 90,000 in Gaalkayo alone. The humanitarian operation is taking place in an environment of high insecurity throughout the country.

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the STAIT mission is to support the HC and HCT to enhance the effectiveness of the humanitarian response in Somalia. STAIT is a peer support mission and will focus on several key areas:

1. **Leadership and Coordination:** Response and coordination is “fit for purpose” in an evolving crisis
2. **Review emergency preparedness response (El Nino)** and capacity for future responses
3. Leadership on **protection**, including Centrality of Protection, protection mainstreaming and gender specific programming
4. **Accountability to affected people** (AAP) collective mechanisms feedback that informs HCT and ICCG decision-making and operations.
5. **Collective access initiatives** which address risks and impediments.

The STAIT mission will facilitate the development of an HCT Action Plan that will be finalized during a retreat on the final day of the mission.

PREPARATION

The mission team will have a tele-conference with the Humanitarian Coordinator, some members of the HCT, and the Somalia NGO Consortium Director prior to the mission to ensure it focuses on the right issues, as identified by humanitarian actors working in Somalia.

APPROACH

The mission will adopt a bottom-up approach to its work that will be flexible and responsive to the operational needs and the mission objectives. The mission team will engage with humanitarian actors through participatory

group meetings (**self-assessment exercises**⁵), small focus group sessions, and individual bilateral meetings. The mission team will conduct a self-assessment exercise with the HCT, the inter-cluster coordination group, national and international NGOs, and will also have consultations with donors and the host Government as appropriate, to stimulate discussion and generate a self-diagnosis of issues that need to be addressed. The team will also have bilateral meetings with heads of UN agencies, international NGOs, and other actors as relevant, during the mission.

The mission team will meet with the different actors in Mogadishu, Nairobi, and in field locations (to be agreed) to engage with people affected by the crises, and with humanitarian actors and local authorities (as appropriate) at the sub-national level. Field visits are an important part of the mission methodology as they enable the team to gain a field perspective on the effectiveness of the response, and help ensure that STAIT support and final HCT Action Plan are well grounded in field realities.

The **HCT retreat** will provide the opportunity for the HCT to discuss the findings of the STAIT mission and agree a way forward. The outcome of the retreat will be **an Action Plan** that will be developed by the HC/HCT with support from STAIT members.

PARTICIPATION

The mission will be led by a Director from the STAIT, with support from a Humanitarian Affairs Officer. The team will be comprised of four senior representatives: two UN agencies and two from international NGOs. They will be representatives of the inter-agency team rather than their organization. The mission will be supported by OCHA Somalia in terms of logistical and travel arrangements.

TENTATIVE PROGRAMME

The STAIT mission will be conducted from 12-24 September, 2016. The mission programme will be developed with the support of OCHA and in consultation with the HC. The mission team will visit two field locations to meet people affected by the crisis, and to engage with front-line humanitarian actors.

REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP

The STAIT will produce a brief report of the main findings of the mission, and an action plan developed with the HCT, two weeks after the end of the mission. The report and action plan will be shared with the HC and HCT, who will have two weeks to comment before the STAIT produces the final report.

The final mission report and plan will be shared with the IASC EDG and will set out any action required on global or technical support. The HC will provide an update to the Emergency Relief Coordinator and IASC EDG on progress towards implementing the plan at a date to be agreed, but between three and five months after the final report.

INFORMATION ON THE STAIT

The Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) was created by the IASC Emergency Directors' Group (EDG) in 2014. Its purpose is to provide peer support to Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) and Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) to strengthen the effectiveness of humanitarian response in the field. The team reports to the EDG.

STAIT missions are carried out at the request of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Emergency Directors' Group (EDG) and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in countries affected by a humanitarian crisis. They are light reviews, which are tailored to the needs of the HC and HCT. Reflecting an inter-agency approach, teams include senior humanitarian practitioners from the UN, NGOs, and other members of the IASC.

Missions use a bottom-up, participatory approach and look at the Transformative Agenda pillars of leadership, coordination, and accountability to affected people (AAP). Missions also look at other issues impacting the effectiveness of the response. Examples include protection, access, security management, emergency preparedness and the link between relief and development. They have a forward looking focus and support the HCT to produce a plan of action.

⁵ The self-assessment is a participatory group exercise that indicates issues of concern from different humanitarian actors. The issues are identified individually and then pooled together to indicate, from a group perspective, what the major issues are that need to be strengthened.

PARTICIPATION

Panos Moutziz (STAIT Director and Team Leader) will lead the mission supported by Gian Carlo Cirri (STAIT Director). The team will be comprised of NGO and UN representatives from the Global Food Security Cluster (Cyril Ferrand), Action Contre Le Faim (Hajir Maalim), the Norwegian Refugee Council (Ulrika Blom) and the Child Protection Area of Responsibility (Michael Copeland). On mission, the team members represent the IASC and not their host organization. Stuart Kefford (STAIT) will be part of the mission team, supporting the substantive elements of the review and other practical support functions.

TENTATIVE PROGRAMME

The STAIT mission will be conducted from 12 to 24 September 2016 (including travel dates) and will include self-assessments with the HCT, the inter-cluster coordination group, international NGOs, national NGOs, and the Humanitarian Teams in the Federal States. The mission will also have bilateral meetings and small focus groups sessions with operational humanitarian partners, donors, cluster coordinators (with a selection of cluster members), the political mission, the peacekeeping presence, national and local authorities (Puntland and Somaliland), and others as relevant.

The team will visit Puntland and Somaliland to meet with people affected by the El Niño drought and floods, humanitarian organisations, and federal state authorities. The details of the field/sub-regional visits are elaborated in a more detailed programme plan. The comprehensive mission schedule will form an annex to this TOR when complete.

REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP

The STAIT will produce a brief draft report of the findings and recommendations within two weeks of the completion of the mission. The report will be accompanied by a HCT-owned action plan that will be prepared during the HCT retreat on the final day of the mission. The report will propose additional technical capacity to support the HC/HCT in implementing the action plan as needed. The draft report will be shared with the HC and HCT, who will have two weeks to provide consolidated comments before the report is finalised.

Within four weeks of completing the mission, the report will be shared with the HC, HCT, the Emergency Directors Group and regional offices, and will outline action required by the Emergency Directors or other global or technical support to the country as necessary. The STAIT secretariat will request a status report on the action plan approximately six months following its submission to the HC/HCT, which will be provided to the Emergency Directors' Group (EDG).

The HC/HCT will complete the last column of the action plan with a status update on each action when submitting the report to the EDG.